By extrapolating Gordon's (1990) measures of the quality-bias in the o¢cial price indexes, we construct quality-adjusted price indexes for 24 types of equipment and software (E&S) from 1947 to 2000 and use them to measure technical change at the aggregate and at the industry level. Technological improvement in E&S accounts for an important fraction of postwar GDP growth and plays a key role in the productivity resurgence of the 1990s. Driving this …nding is 4 percent annual growth in the quality of E&S in the postwar period and more than 6 percent annual growth in the 1990s. The acceleration in the 1990s occurred in every industry, consistent with the idea that information technology represents a general purpose technology. Furthermore, we measure for the aggregate economy and di¤erent sectors the "technological gap": how much more productive new machines are compared to the average machine. We show that the technological gap explains the dynamics of investment in new technologies and the returns to human capital, consistent with Nelson and Phelps' (1966) conjecture.
Introduction
Technological improvement in equipment and software in the postwar period has been remarkable.
In the …eld of microelectronics the advances have been spectacular, owing mainly to progress in the manufacture of semiconductors. In the semiconductor industry, Moore's Law -which predicts that the number of transistors per integrated circuit doubles every 18 months -seems to suggest that technical progress is an inexorable process. In fact, progress proceeds apace because …rms reap productive bene…ts by investing in the latest technologies. 1 Investment in microelectronics has been especially widespread so that microelectronics are now the key components in all kinds of goods, resulting in improvements in quality that were once unimaginable. Advances in other technologies like miniaturization have been impressive as well. Moreover, experimental technologies, such as fusion, high-temperature superconductors and quantum computing, hold the promise of even more rapid technical change in the future.
The extent to which such rapid technical change is an engine of growth and a source of interesting macroeconomic dynamics is a quantitative question that can be approached using measures of constant-quality price indexes for capital goods. 2 Building on Gordon's (1990) systematic measurement of quality-adjusted prices for di¤erent types of producers' durable equipment, Hulten (1992) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) -thereafter GHK-measure the contribution of equipment-embodied technical change to aggregate growth using a Solow (1960) vintage model. Because Gordon's data cover the postwar period until 1983, Hulten's analysis is limited to that period, while GHK extend the aggregate constant-quality price index to 1992 by applying a constant adjustment factor to the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) o¢cial price index.
We …ll this gap by estimating for each type of equipment the rate of quality improvement since 1983. Starting with Gordon's quality-adjusted price indexes for 1947-83, we estimate the quality bias implicit in the NIPA price indexes for that period. Using the NIPA series, we then extrapolate the quality bias from 1984 to 2000. From this we construct constant-quality price indexes for the capital goods that make up equipment and software (E&S). We view this approach as a sensible albeit crude alternative to the preferable approach that would quality-adjust every 1 Intel and other semiconductor manufacturers are no exception. In the last 20 years Intel alone spent on average more than two billion per year in constant 1996 dollars on plant, equipment, and R&D. 2 Production function estimation is an alternative approach to measuring technical change. Bakh and Gort (1993), Gort, Bahk and Wall (1993) and Sakellaris and Wilson (2000) focus on estimating the e¤ect of investment-speci…c technical change while Stiroh (2001) is a recent entry in the voluminous literature pursuing the more traditional approach which ascribes technical change to the residuals from estimation. In addition, Hobijn (2000) suggests an approach based on structural estimation of an Euler equation for investment. asset in E&S using hedonic techniques, a monumental e¤ort that Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is implementing piecemeal.
The speed of technical change for each capital good in E&S can be measured as the di¤erence between the growth rate of constant-quality consumption and the growth rate of the good's qualityadjusted price. Excluding computers and software, for which NIPA price series seem preferable to the ones generated by our alternative approach, we conclude that the greatest technical change occurred in communications equipment (9 percent per year), aircraft (8 percent per year), and instruments (6 percent per year). Using these asset-speci…c constant-quality price indexes we build an aggregate index of investment-speci…c technical change for the US economy. This index grows at an average annual rate of 4 percent in the postwar period, with a sharp acceleration in the 1980s that leads to an average annual growth rate of more than 6 percent in the 1990s. Most of the acceleration is due to a shift in investment expenditures towards computers, software, and communications equipment.
We also construct measures of investment-speci…c technical change at the two-digit and …ner industry level using BEA's detailed estimates of E&S investment by industry and type of asset, which are based on a variety of source material including the input-output tables. It comes as no surprise that there are big di¤erences in the rate of technical change at the industry level.
For example, the growth rates of the 90th and the 10th percentile of the distribution di¤er by more than 5 percentage points in each year. What is perhaps surprising given the diversity of industries is that the distribution has remained stable in the postwar period. In particular, the rate of growth accelerates in the 1990s by a similar amount in virtually every industry, demonstrating that information technology a¤ects productivity in a general way. This result as well as others we present support the idea that information technology is a "general purpose" technology.
Previous empirical studies using quality-adjusted measures of investment constructed the productive capital stock with economic depreciation rates from BEA or from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Economic depreciation incorporates the e¤ect of productive decay and obsolescence. We remove the obsolescence component from BEA economic depreciation using our estimates of asset-speci…c quality improvement. Using these corrected depreciation rates and our quality-adjusted investment price indexes, we construct a measure of the aggregate capital stock for E&S that grows at an annual rate of 8.8 percent in the postwar period. This growth rate is 3 percentage points greater than growth rate of the capital stock constructed using the o¢cial depreciation rates and price indexes.
With our estimates of quality-adjusted productive capital stock, we perform a statistical and an equilibrium growth accounting exercise. Regardless of how real GDP is quality-adjusted, improvement in the quality of E&S explains about 20 percent of growth in the US in the postwar period and about 30 percent of growth in the 1990s. During the 1990s, quality improvement outside of high-tech categories is more important than quality improvement inside high-tech categories -a …nding that is underappreciated by those who focus on the role of information technology in the growth resurgence. This explains why our results di¤er somewhat compared to Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000) , which take the o¢cial statistics more or less at face value. Although Jorgenson et al. …nd that information technology plays a leading role in the resurgence of GDP growth in the 1990s, they also …nd that a large part of GDP growth is left unexplained. According to our calculations, the growth rate of this residual -called total factor productivity (TFP) -is 0. 4 represents the unmeasured quality of capital that our approach identi…es. When we embed this growth accounting exercise in a structural equilibrium model along the lines suggested by GHK, we …nd that 60 percent of labor productivity growth in the postwar period comes from technological advances in E&S.
Since a substantial increase in the quality of E&S was largely responsible for the growth resurgence in the 1990s, it may be reasonable to suspect that such gains are unsustainable. However, our results show that there is a great deal of potential productivity improvement that remains to be done. Based on our calculations, the technological gap between the productivity of the best technology and the productivity of the average practice in the economy was 15 percent in 1975. In 2000, the …gure had jumped to 40 percent. The technological gap actually increased by 5 percentage points in the 1990s, despite the boom in capital spending.
According to Nelson and Phelps (1966) , the improvement of the average productivity of capital depends on the technological gap between the best and average technology and on "adaptable" labor which de…nes human capital. We estimate an adoption equation based on this idea using aggregate data and …nd that it …ts very well. The growth rate of the average practice moves nearly one-for-one with the technological gap and is correlated with measures of adaptable labor (such as the shares in the labor force of college graduates and of young workers).
Another implication of the Nelson and Phelps model is that the returns to adaptability increase with the technological gap. We con…rm this by showing that the returns to education and the technological gap move in lock-step during the postwar period. In particular, the technological gap stopped growing in the 1970s, the only period in which wage inequality moderated. When the gap increased in the 1980s and 1990s, wage inequality increased as well. This suggests the technological gap may be a key determinant of wage inequality. Perhaps then rising wage inequality is a persistent feature of economies experiencing rapid technological improvement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model in which prices are used to measure investment-speci…c technical change, outlines the econometric methodology we use to construct the constant-quality price indexes, and describes the estimation results. In section 3, we use the estimates to construct measures of technical change at the aggregate, asset, and industry levels. In section 4, we examine the implications of technical change for postwar growth. Section 5 shows that the technological gap has been growing and that it determines the speed of adoption of new technology and the skill premium. In section 6, we consider the robustness of our results to generalizations of our benchmark model. In the …nal section, we sum-up our major …ndings and make a …rst attempt at relating them to each other.
Methodology

Measuring Investment-Speci…c Technical Change Using Prices
Quality improvement in investment goods is pervasive, especially in high-tech categories. For example, a new PC may have the same price today as a new PC had …ve years ago, but if it provides 10 times as much computing power as before, in e¤ect the constant-quality price of the new PC is one-tenth the price of the old PC. The opportunity cost of innovating -whether it is in producing PCs or tractors -is foregone consumption. Intuition therefore suggests that a comparison of constant-quality investment prices with a constant-quality consumption price is an informative measure of technical change. We formalize this idea in a very simple two-sector model in which an investment good and …nal goods are produced competitively.
Final goods x t are produced competitively with some constant returns to scale combination of capital and labor. They can be used for consumption or in the production of e¢ciency-units of investment goods i ¤ , according to the linear technology
where q t is a Hicks-neutral index of the state of technology used to produce investment goods. 3 The 3 In this simple model, it is irrelevant whether we call q "disembodied" or "embodied" technology. As pointed out originally by Hall (1968) , in this type of model the embodied and the disembodied components are not identi…ed separately. Following the bulk of the literature, we refer to changes in q as investment-speci…c technical change.
price of investment goods in e¢ciency units is p i ¤ t and the price of constant-quality consumption goods is p c ¤ t . Competition in the investment goods sector implies
Using equations (1) and (2) we can measure investment-speci…c technical change using prices as
where ¢ denotes the growth rate. 4 In section 6, we consider how generalizations of this basic approach -such as mismeasurement, mark-ups and changing factor shares -a¤ect our …ndings.
Data Sources
Outside of computers and software, items for which BEA provides some of the most reliable constant-quality price indexes, our primary source for constant-quality price indexes is Gordon (1990 This taxonomy of goods re ‡ected the NIPA classi…cation at the time when Gordon was writing.
Luckily, the current NIPA classi…cation is similar except for the last group of goods. BEA now distinguishes explicitly among computers and peripherals and other o¢ce and accounting machinery.
Moreover, since 1999 software is recorded as investment. 5 This …rst group of goods is now called information processing equipment and software (IPES) and the entire set of 24 investment goods is called nonresidential private …xed investment in equipment and software (E&S).
Econometric Model
We use simple forecasting methods to extrapolate for the period 1984-2000 the quality-bias implicit in some of the NIPA price series. We use as a benchmark Gordon's computations, which covered the period 1947-1983. In addition to providing a longer sample period for statistical analysis, we can see whether there has been an acceleration in technical change in the past two decades that may help explain the surge in the growth rates of GDP and average labor productivity in the late-1990s.
To construct the extended quality-adjusted price series, we update and improve upon the analy- 
where p i ¤ j t is Gordon's quality-adjusted price index for asset category j, c is the constant, t is the linear time trend, p i j t and p i j t¡1 are, respectively, the current and lagged value of the NIPA price index, ¢y t¡1 is the growth rate of lagged GDP and " A number of econometric issues arise in the choice of the model speci…cation. To begin with, we had to choose the order of integration of the series. We …rst tested for a unit root in the qualityadjusted and NIPA price index using Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. We could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for any of the series. 6 Next, we tested for cointegration 5 Previously, only software embedded in equipment by the producer of that good was counted as investment. That type of software is still counted as hardware (e.g., Microsoft's Windows operating system already installed on new PCs). 6 Structural breaks could be present in some of the series (e.g., aircraft). It is well known that the existence of between the quality-adjusted and NIPA price series using the Johansen test. For almost all assets we could not reject the null of cointegration at the 10 percent level and for most assets we could not reject at the 5 percent level. From this battery of tests we concluded that the quality-adjusted and the NIPA price series are I(1) and cointegrated. Hence, estimation in levels exploits the long-run comovements of the series and generates a more informative forecast compared to a speci…cation in …rst-di¤erences. 7 We use a time trend, lagged GDP growth, and lags of the NIPA price index in the speci…cation. 8 An alternative speci…cation with lags of the dependent variable would have necessitated multistep forecasting methods in which the computed forecast of the lagged dependent variable is used recursively. Given the 16-year span over which we need to predict our series, we prefer to anchor our forecast only to actual data.
Our procedure explicitly accounts for the fact that BEA has upgraded its measurement of quality over time. Hence, we do not naively extrapolate the quality-bias in the NIPA price indexes from earlier to later periods. However, the admittedly disputable assumption for the accuracy of our approach is that the data generating process for the quality-bias in the NIPA price indexes has not changed since 1983. For this reason, we do not implement this procedure for most of the goods included in the IPES category, in particular computers and peripherals since BEA provides a reliable constant-quality price index for this category. We also cannot apply our methodology to software, as data on software investment were unavailable to Gordon. Instead, for software we use the NIPA price indexes. By proceeding in this way we minimize the bias that arises if the key assumption underlying our estimation and forecasting methodology is violated. 9 Finally, the introduction of current and lagged values of the NIPA price variables in our regression implies a trade-o¤ between accuracy in forecasting and a potential endogeneity problem.
Our estimates are biased insofar as shocks to quality not controlled for in the regression a¤ect the breaks biases unit root tests against rejecting the null hypothesis. In the most obvious cases, we judgmentally split the sample in two and tested for a unit root in each subsample. There were no major changes in the results. 7 We did plenty of sensitivity analysis on the price series for which the evidence on cointegration was weaker. Notably, we used di¤erent speci…cations of the model in …rst-di¤erences with very little change in the extrapolated series. 8 We followed a mixture of Akaike and Schwartz criteria to select the optimal order lag in each equation. 9 It is somewhat comforting that extrapolation is also used by BEA and other researchers when better sources of data are unavailable. For example, the NIPA price index for pre-packaged software (which is quality-adjusted) is back-cast from 1985 using a time series equal to 60 percent of the annual change in the NIPA price index for computers and peripherals, which corresponds to the average price di¤erence from 1985-1997 between the annual rate of change in the computer price index and the pre-packaged software price index. Moreover, some authors such as Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a) have drawn from the existing empirical results of microstudies on quality improvements in switching gear equipment and spreadsheets to construct constant-quality indexes in order to de ‡ate software and communications investment. unadjusted price level. To assess this endogeneity problem, we forecasted Gordon's quality bias using only a constant and a trend. When we tried this alternative, our results were not appreciably di¤erent for most assets, suggesting such endogeneity is a secondary concern. indicating that quality-bias in the NIPA price index is unimportant. For these assets, we suppressed the trend and used the estimates reported to extrapolate the series.
Quality
Quality-Adjusted Price Indexes for IPES
Information processing equipment and software (IPES) contains the assets with the fastest rising nominal investment shares and most rapid price declines. To construct a quality-adjusted price index for computers and peripherals, we combine two data sources. First, Gordon provides a quality-adjusted index for computers and peripherals for 1947-1983 (Table 6 .12, column 2). Second, in 1985 BEA introduced hedonic-based quality-adjusted price indexes for computers and peripherals starting from 1958 (Table 7 .8, SCB). 10 We combine these two sources, using Gordon's index from 1947-1957 and the NIPA index from 1958 onward. 11 We exploit the 1999 comprehensive revision of the NIPA that provides price indexes beginning in 1959 for prepackaged software sold commercially, own-account software (software developed internally by …rms themselves), and custom software (software tailored to the speci…cations of …rms and purchased externally by these …rms). The series for prepackaged software is computed using both matched-model methods and hedonic techniques; conversely, the price index for ownaccount software is based on compensation rates for computer programmers and system analysts and on the cost of the intermediate inputs associated with their work; the price index for custom software is computed as a weighted average of the …rst two indexes. 12 The price of pre-packaged software has been falling at the fastest rate (11 percent per year). This rapid decline has contributed to the slowdown in the rise of the overall quality-adjusted price of software: from 2 percent in the period 1959-78 to virtually zero since then. 13 There are a few studies that can be used to check the adjustment BEA makes for prepackaged software. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) report that the quality-adjusted price of spreadsheets falls at an annual rate of 16 percent from 1987 to 1992. This is slightly faster than the 15 percent decline estimated by Gandal (1994) for 1986-1991. The average rate of change of the BEA price index for prepackaged software is 13 percent per year in the comparable period, suggesting that the quality-adjustment in the NIPA data may be fairly accurate. 14 Nevertheless, the fact remains that prices for the other two categories of software are almost certainly overstated substantially. In the absence of a comprehensive alternative, we take a conservative approach and use the NIPA price index for software.
Communications equipment and instruments are the other goods for which we would expect rapid price declines. Unfortunately, systematic studies of the quality-bias in the BEA price index 1 1 Krusell et al. (2000) exploit the large empirical literature on the derivation of quality-adjusted price indexes for computers and peripherals to extend the Gordon series to 1992. As an alternative, we also constructed a constantquality index for computers and peripherals using Gordon's price series until 1983 and the Krusell et al. series thereafter. The resulting price index and our benchmark index are similar in the …rst half of the sample: for both series the average decline rate of the quality-adjusted price is around 16 percent from 1947 to 1973. However, in the second part of the sample, the benchmark series declines at an annual average of 17 percent whereas the GordonKrusell series declines at an annual average of 20 percent. The di¤erence is concentrated in the late-1980s and the early-1990s. Overall, our benchmark price index provides a conservative estimate of quality improvement in computers and peripherals. 1 2 The methodology used to construct these indexes is described in detail in Parker and Grimm (1998) . 1 3 The aggregate price series for software investment is the Tornquist aggregate of the three price series using their respective nominal investment shares as weights. 1 4 The fact that the BEA number is slightly lower may be attributable to the fact that prepackaged software does not include only spreadsheets. Oliner and Sichel (1994) estimate a 3 percent price decline during an earlier period for a bundle of prepackaged software programs including spreadsheets, word processors and databases. Hence, evidence suggests that the price decline for software other than spreadsheets has been slower. have yet to be done: BEA has adopted a constant-quality index only for digital switching equipment which is a subcategory of communications equipment (Grimm, 1997) . However, the quality of other fast-growing types of telecommunications equipment has improved vastly (e.g., …ber-optic cables). Therefore, we use the same forecasting procedure we applied to the goods outside IPES and report in Table 1 the results for communications (column 20) and instruments (column 21).
Our estimated constant-quality price indexes for communications equipment and for instruments decline at an annual rate of nearly 7 percent and nearly 5 percent, respectively. By contrast, their NIPA counterparts re ‡ect very little change.
Finally, since Gordon's work does not contain a quality-adjusted series for o¢ce and accounting equipment goods other than computers, for this set of goods we simply use the NIPA series (Table   7 .8, SCB). It is clear that this conservative choice will have only a small e¤ect since this type of investment has never accounted for more than 3 percent of E&S and its share has been falling monotonically over time.
Quality-Adjusted Price Index for Consumption
We rely entirely on the NIPAs for a constant-quality price index for consumption. Our preferred price index is constructed with the prices of nondurable goods (excluding energy expenditures which can be exogenously a¤ected by ‡uctuations in the price of petroleum) and non-housing services (from Table 7 .5, SCB), weighted by their respective shares (from Table 2 .2, SCB) through a Tornquist procedure. As a very basic way to assess the robustness of our results, we compared our preferred price index to others that include, in turn, energy expenditures, housing services and residential structures. Despite our concern, the movement of these various price indexes is remarkably similar and they all grow at an annual rate of just less than 4 percent.
and the level of the price index is recovered recursively
By comparing the growth rate of the quality-adjusted price index for E&S in equation (5) to the NIPA price index for E&S we can compute the quality-bias in the NIPA price index. Recall that this bias arises because we use for 21 of the 24 categories of E&S constant-quality price indexes that decline more rapidly than the comparable NIPA price indexes. According to our estimates, the average annual quality-bias is about 2.5 percent over the sample period. Perhaps surprisingly, the quality-bias is about the same in the 1980s and 1990s when computers and software -for which we rely on the NIPA de ‡ators -are a growing share of investment. The reason is that there is a great deal of quality-bias in some fast-growing categories like communications equipment.
This e¤ect approximately o¤sets the smaller quality-bias stemming from an increase in the share of computers and software.
Robustness Check
Our methodology explained Section 2.2 is silent about the mechanism that generates quality improvement. In this volume, Wilson argues that R&D determines the rate of quality improvement.
As a robustness check, we replaced the time trend in equation (4) with the log of the R&D capital stock for 10 di¤erent types of equipment from 1957-97. 15 In the bottom panel of Table 1 , we also report results using the overlapping sample of Gordon's quality-adjusted price data and Wilson's R&D data. The coe¢cient estimates on the log of the stock of R&D is statistically signi…cant for 8 of the 11 types of equipment.
Using the estimates from this alternative speci…cation, we extrapolate the quality-adjusted price until 1997 and Tornquist-aggregate the asset-speci…c price indexes as described in equation (5 
where p c ¤ t is the consumption price index. In Figure 1 , we plot the aggregate rate of investmentspeci…c technical change ¢q e t as the solid line. Two important …ndings emerge: …rst, technical change grows rapidly -at an annual average of 4 percent -in the postwar period; second, since the mid-1970s the pace of technological improvement has accelerated: the index grows at an annual rate of about 3 percent until 1975 and at an annual rate of 5 percent thereafter. 16 In the 1990s the growth has been spectacularly high, reaching an average annual rate in excess of 6 percent. We postpone discussing the dashed line in Figure 1 -an alternative measure of technical change that adjusts for factor share bias -until section 6.
Not surprisingly, our baseline estimate of the annual growth rate of technical change is similar to Hulten's (1992) estimate of 3.4 percent for the comparable period, 1949-1983. Hobijn (2000) calculates the rate of embodied technical change by calibrating a vintage capital model. According to his computations, the average annual growth rate of embodied technical change in equipment and structures is 2.5 percent. When we include structures in our index and assume conservatively that structures have no quality improvement, our comparable estimate of the growth rate is 2.6 percent: not only are the annual averages very similar, the time pattern of the two series is similar as well.
The production function approach used for example by Bahk and Gort (1993) and Sakellaris and Wilson (2000) on plant-level data yields estimates of the growth rate of capital-embodied technical change between 12 and 18 percent per year, much larger than our estimate.
Asset Indexes
The index of the state of technology for a speci…c asset j is constructed as metalworking equipment, and own-account software. 17 A careful review of Table 2 shows that in most of the other categories productivity growth accelerated only in the 1990s. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that in a …rst phase (1970s and 1980s) productivity advancements have been concentrated in IPES goods, while later (in the 1990s) the new technologies started to be applied to a much wider range of goods beyond IPES, fully displaying the "general purpose" nature of the new technology.
Industry Indexes
We also construct measures of technical change at the two-digit industry level using BEA's detailed estimates of E&S investment by industry and type of asset, which are based on a variety of source material including the input-output tables. 18 Our industry-level measures of technical change are obtained through the same Tornquist aggregation procedure we adopt for the economy-wide index in equation (5), where each asset-speci…c constant-quality price index is weighted by the industrylevel nominal expenditure shares for that asset. 19 These indexes are meant to measure the rate of technological improvement in the typical mix of investment goods used in production by each two-digit industry. Table 3 documents the growth rates of technical change for 11 major industries by decade.
Wide variation in the growth rates is apparent: quality improvements in investment goods used in the communications industry advanced at an 8 percent annual rate during the postwar period, while agriculture, forestry and …shing experienced a relatively dismal 1 percent annual growth rate.
To appreciate such heterogeneity, in Figure 2 we plot the annual distribution of technical change -90th percentile, median, mean and 10th percentile -using the most detailed classi…cation of 62 industries available using our data. Each industry-year observation is weighted by the nominal industry investment share that year. Two …ndings stand out from Figure 2 : …rst, there is a lot of heterogeneity across industries as evidenced by the 6 percent annual average di¤erence between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the distribution; second, over the years this di¤erential has remained quite stable and has moved in tune with the mean which suggests that the IPES-led technological acceleration that began in the mid 1970s had a general impact, reaching virtually every industry in the economy.
As another way to assess the general impact of IPES, we can calculate the transition probability for industries within the distribution. In the last two decades, the persistence of an industry's relative position in the distribution has increased signi…cantly. 20 This suggests that productivity improvements in the best-practice technology are more the result of an aggregate shock, rather than industry-speci…c shocks. Taken together, our …ndings con…rm the idea that IPES is a "general purpose" technology.
Quality-Adjusted E&S Capital Stock
We create a quality-adjusted investment series i ¤ et by dividing nominal E&S investment by the quality-adjusted price index p i ¤ e t . Then we construct the aggregate quality-adjusted productive capital stock of E&S k ¤ et using the perpetual inventory method and a constant geometric rate of depreciation:
where ± e t is the time-varying physical depreciation rate.
each category. 2 0 If we divide the cross-industry distribution of technical change into quartiles and weight each industry by its nominal investment share, the diagonal elements of the transition matrix are on average 0.45 during the postwar period, rising to 0.70 during the 1990s.
As Oliner (1993), Gort and Wall (1998) and Whelan (2000) show, physical depreciation must be used to construct the quality-adjusted productive capital stock when investment is measured in e¢ciency units. Largely as a result of Oliner's research, BEA began to construct its capital stocks correctly, but only for the assets Oliner studied, mainframes and peripherals. For every other type of asset, BEA continues to construct capital stocks using economic depreciation. This causes the capital stock to be mismeasured, especially for the types of assets that are subject to rapid quality improvement over time, such as PCs, prepackaged software and communication equipment. 21 BEA reports economic depreciation rates by asset d 
Obviously, when there is no technical change, economic and physical depreciation are identical.
However, when technology improves, economic depreciation exceeds physical depreciation. Using the identity in equation (9) we separate the physical decay component ± j t from the BEA measures of d t to appropriately construct the aggregate series for k ¤ et . For each asset category j, we use the o¢cial depreciation rates and equation (9) -where we measure q j t from equation (7) -to back out the actual physical decay rate ± j t . As suggested by Whelan (2000) , we then aggregate these physical depreciation rates in each year using the nominal capital shares of each asset in the total E&S capital stock s k j (we compute these from the nominal capital shares from the BEA Fixed Assets Tables), in order to obtain a series for the physical depreciation rate in E&S ± Figure 3 plots three series: the o¢cial economic depreciation rate d e t , our computed series for physical depreciation ± e t , and a polynomial-smoothed version of our series. 22 The BEA rate of economic depreciation rises from 12 percent in the 1950s to over 15 percent at the end of the sample, while our estimated series, although very volatile because of the variability implicit in our measures of technical change, looks nearly ‡at at 10 percent. Hence, the gap between economic depreciation and physical depreciation that opened up in the mid-1970s can be attributed to losses in the value of assets because of faster obsolescence. The rise in the importance of the obsolescence component over time is principally due to the increasing share of IPES in the capital stock. To parallel the practice of the BEA of using constant depreciation rates, even for long periods, in what follows we always use our smoothed series. Perhaps surprisingly, we found that our quantitative results were little a¤ected using the non-smoothed physical depreciation rates.
In Table 4 we compare the growth rates of our quality-adjusted capital stock ¢k ¤ e and the BEA capital stock ¢k BEA e . Our capital stock of E&S, which is based on quality-adjusted investment ‡ows and physical depreciation, grew at an annual average rate of 8.8 percent in the postwar period. By contrast, the BEA capital stock, which is based on quality-adjusted investment ‡ows for a subset of assets and economic depreciation, grew at an annual average of 5.8 percent in the postwar period. About 80 percent of the di¤erence between the growth rates is due to missing quality-adjustment in the BEA price indexes. The residual is due to the presence of obsolescence in the o¢cial depreciation rates. 23 Given the emphasis on the role of IPES capital in explaining US growth in the past decade, it is interesting to compute the dynamics of the IPES capital stock. As a by-product, we can use this quality-adjusted IPES capital stock as a separate factor of production in our growth decomposition. In order to compute a rate of physical decay for the stock of IPES goods, we repeat the same procedure outlined above. Our estimated depreciation rate is substantially lower than the NIPA series (the di¤erence is 5 percentage points at the beginning of the sample and 7 percentage points at the end of the sample); moreover, our implied rate of physical decay displays 2 2 We do not …lter out the obsolescence component from mainframes and peripherals, as the BEA depreciation rates for these goods are net of this component (see Oliner 1993 for details). For autos and PCs, BEA does not report a geometric depreciation rate, but rather an age-dependent depreciation schedule. We approximate these with a constant geometric rate of 25 percent and 40 percent per year, respectively. 2 3 We also computed the di¤erence between the growth rate of our series and the growth rate of a series constructed using investment valued in terms of consumption and economic depreciation. The overall di¤erence between the annual growth rate of our series and this alternative series is 3.7 percent. Gort and Wall (1998) show that if both the physical decay rate ± e and the rate of obsolescence ¢q (technical change) are constant, then the di¤erence between the two series should be exactly ¢q, which is 4 percent for our series. Thus, given that ± e t is about ‡at, the 0.3 percentage point di¤erential is from the large variation of ¢qt.
a rise at the beginning of the 1980s (from 13 to 16 percent), consistent with BEA's claim that the physical depreciation rate for computers and peripherals increased from 27 percent to 31 percent after 1978. 24 The resulting quality-adjusted productive capital stock for IPES reported in Table 3 grows at an annual average of 16.3 percent over the sample, compared to an annual growth rate of the BEA series of 12.3 percent. The decomposition of this di¤erential between quality-adjustment of the investment ‡ows (namely communications and instruments, as for all other IPES goods we have used BEA data) and the presence of obsolescence in economic depreciation yields about the same 80-20 split as the decomposition for aggregate E&S.
Structures Capital Stock
For growth accounting, we need to integrate the structures capital stock into our framework. To de ‡ate nominal investment in structures, we use the NIPA price indexes for 19 di¤erent categories of structures. On aggregate, this price index for structures grew just a little faster than the price index for consumption in the postwar period, which implies that there was no appreciable quality improvement in structures. However, according to Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999), structuresembodied technical change advanced at an annual rate of 1 percent in the postwar period. Hence, we might underestimate the growth rate of structures by using the NIPA price indexes. Nevertheless, in keeping with our conservative approach, we use the NIPA price indexes.
Creating an aggregate stock of equipment and structures in e¢ciency units (k ¤ t ) takes three steps. First, we construct a price index for total business …xed investment by weighting the two price indexes for E&S and structures by their nominal investment shares. Second, we calculate a physical depreciation rate for business …xed investment. In doing so, we compute an average depreciation rate for structures of about 3 percent per year. 25 Finally, we construct the aggregate capital stock using the perpetual inventory method and a constant geometric rate of physical depreciation.
4 Growth Accounting
"Statistical" Growth Accounting
Using statistical growth accounting we can attribute the growth in real GDP to the share-weighted growth in inputs and, in particular, to quality improvement in capital goods. It is straightforward to show that our simple theoretical model in Section 2.1, together with equation (8) can be interpreted as a one-sector growth model with an aggregate production function. In our accounting framework, we use a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation for the production function and we measure real GDP in constant-quality consumption units. We focus on the domestic private business sector of the US economy. A standard computation yields a labor share with an average value 0:64 for the period 1947-2000. We measure real GDP growth in the private business sector directly from NIPA (Table
1.8, SCB).
When decomposing the sources of real GDP growth, we distinguish between the contribution made by the quantity of capital (Q t ) and by the quality of capital ³k t´. The quantity of capital is measured in terms of constant-quality consumption units. The quality of capital is measured as the ratio of the quality-adjusted capital stock (k ¤ t ) and the capital stock measured in terms of constant-quality consumption:
Hence, the quality of capital isolates the contribution to real GDP growth from our quality-adjusted investment price indexes. 26 To measure labor input l t , we use the quality-adjusted index created by Ho and Jorgenson (1999 , Table 5 ) which allows us to distinguish between quantity of labor (hours worked n t ) and quality of labor (h t ), with l t = h t n t . 27 Our statistical growth accounting is based on decomposing real GDP growth ¢y t into the share-weighted growth in inputs
where ® denoted the capital share. In Table 5 , we report the results of the statistical growth accounting for a variety of periods. 28 In the postwar period, the total contribution of capital to output growth is nearly 54 percent, whereas the contribution of labor input is 32 percent. TFP 2 6 Notice that the quality of capital we measure is not the usual one, de…ned as the di¤erence between capital services and capital stocks created with NIPA price indexes. That di¤erence measures the composition e¤ect of moving toward assets with short service lives and, hence, high estimated productivity during each year of service. In future research, we plan to combine approaches by constructing the capital services of our quality-adjusted capital stock. 2 7 Ho and Jorgenson's index is constructed for total private sector, including business sector, private households and non-pro…t institutions. Private households are not a major source of employment, but there remains a slight discrepancy between our output measure and the labor index due to the non-pro…t sector. 2 8 We begin in 1948 and end in 1999 because the labor index constructed by Ho and Jorgenson spans that period.
growth accounts for the remaining 14 percent of growth. The contributions of both capital and labor grow steadily over the sample period at the expense of TFP, which has a negative contribution in the last 20 years.
Out of the 54 percent average contribution of capital, about 20 percent is due to quality improvement in total capital. In the 1990s the contribution jumps to more than 30 percent. Since the contribution of every other factor falls or is about ‡at in the 1990s, our …ndings indicate that the jump in the quality of capital in the 1990s explains the resurgence in real GDP growth. As we would expect, the contribution of productivity improvement in IPES capital grows enormously over the sample, from just 1 percent in the 1950s to over 12 percent in the 1990s, averaging 6 percent in the postwar period. 29 By contrast, the contribution of worker quality was very high in the 1950s, but it falls sharply in the 1980s and the 1990s, possibly because of the entry of the baby-boom cohorts in the late 1970s and because the strong labor market of the 1990s absorbed predominantly workers from the lower part of the skills distribution.
A number of authors (e.g., Hulten, 1992 , Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000a , 2000b argue that GDP should be quality-adjusted in proportion to the division between consumption and investment. For comparability, we create a Tornquist price index from personal consumption expenditures (Table   10 .1, SCB) and from business …xed investment, where we use our quality-adjusted price index for the latter component. Real GDP growth computed in this way is on average 0.3 percentage points greater than GDP measured in constant-quality consumption units, but this di¤erence is twice as large in the 1990s. As a result, we …nd that the contribution of capital and labor is smaller in the 1990s, implying a larger contribution of TFP which is no longer negative. The TFP contribution remains positive in the 1980s and increases substantially in the 1990s. We analyze the e¤ect of this pick-up on labor productivity in the late-1990s in more detail in Section 4:3.
Hulten (1992) where st denotes the nominal share in the total capital stock at time t.
input contributes 34 percent. This implies TFP accounts for 17 percent of growth. Despite the fact that we …nd a similar contribution for capital in e¢ciency units, our estimates suggest that a much larger fraction is due to quality. We also compute the contribution of labor to be roughly 3 percentage points smaller, which boosts up by the same amount our estimate of the share of TFP growth.
"Equilibrium" growth accounting
One disadvantage of statistical growth accounting is that it does not isolate the underlying sources for capital accumulation. As a result, such growth accounting is silent about whether, for example, the quantity of capital increased because there were advances in the productivity of new investment goods or because of TFP. By contrast, a structural equilibrium model can be used to solve for the optimal investment policy rule as a function of the underlying sources of growth of the economy.
Our economy displays three sources of growth in per capita income (or labor productivity y t =n t ): technical change in producing capital q t , quality improvement in labor h t , and total factor productivity z t . Assuming that all three sources of growth are exogenous, it is a simple exercise to use the solution of an equilibrium model to attribute income per capita growth entirely to the three sources. 30 We …nd that technological advance in producing capital dwarfs the other two sources of growth: 60 percent of growth from 1948-1999 is explained by quality improvement the production of capital, 25 percent is due to improvements in the quality of labor (essentially linked to the rising educational attainment of the population), and the residual 15 percent is due to neutral technical change. Our results are in line with the equilibrium growth accounting exercise of GHK who quanti…ed the contribution of q t for the whole economy to be 58 percent from 1954-1990. 31 
Productivity Surge in Late-1990s: Cycle or Trend?
The performance of the US economy in the second half of the 1990s has been remarkable. According to our calculations, real GDP growth in the private sector averaged 5.2 percent per year from 1995 to 1999, while the average in the preceding two decades had been just below 3.5 percent. This large acceleration in real GDP growth has generated a debate among economists about (1) whether IPES investment drives the acceleration, and (2) whether the upturn is cyclical or structural. 32 Both studies document that the TFP acceleration is large even in industries that do not use IPES intensively. However, neither study attempts to disentangle the cyclical and structural components of the upswing. Gordon (2000) o¤ers a more skeptical view about the role of IPES investment. According to Gordon, more than one-third of the labor productivity resurgence of the late 1990s is a cyclical phenomenon. Moreover, he …nds that the bulk of disembodied productivity acceleration is concentrated in IPES-intensive industries, with other industries gaining little if anything from the "IT revolution". 33 In Table 6 , we report our own decomposition of the increase in the grwoth rate of labor productivity in the late-1990s. For this exercise, we use real GDP constructed with a price index that includes our constant-quality investment price index, as in the right panel of Table 5 . We distinguish among capital deepening, labor quality changes, and TFP. According to our calculations, the growth rate of labor productivity increased from an annual rate of 1. To analyze whether the increase is temporary or permanent, we split each component of labor productivity into cycle and trend using a Hodrick-Prescott …lter. The commonly used smoothing parameter for annual data is¸= 100, but recently Ravn and Uhlig (2001) argue that the best choice is¸= 6:25 which implies a more volatile trend component. Thus, with a lower¸we would expect to obtain a lower bound for the cyclical component. We …nd that the cyclical component of the increase in labor productivity growth is bounded between 30 percent and 90 percent. Hence, Gordon's estimate of one-third could well be conservative. 34 From Table 6 , we also conclude that the deceleration in labor quality is mostly a cyclical phenomenon (probably associated with a strong labor market that drew from the bottom tail of the skills distribution), while the acceleration in the quality of capital is a structural phenomenon. The large gap between the upper and lower bound in the estimation of the cyclical component is linked to TFP: the data cannot disentangle whether the surge in TFP belongs to the cycle or to the trend. The answer to this question will determine whether the strong labor productivity performance of the US economy will extend beyond the typical length of an expansion.
Technological Gap and Its E¤ects
Technological Gap Between Productivity of New Vintages and Average Practice
Hulten (1992) shows that quality-adjusted price indexes can be used to measure the "technological gap" between the productivity of new vintages and the average practice in the economy. Let the average e¢ciency level of E&S be Figure 4 is evident at every quantile of the industry distribution, Figure 5 shows a rise in the di¤erence between the 90th and 10th quantile over time. In 1968, the technological gap of the 90th percentile was 30 percent and the technological gap of the 10th percentile was 10 percent. Thirty years later, these two numbers are 55 percent and 20 percent, respectively. Given that the productivity of new vintages accelerated at about the same rate across all 62 industries (see Figure 2) , this latter …nding suggests that the speed of adoption of new technologies has been very di¤erent across industries. This is con…rmed by comparing the technological gaps by 11 major industries in Table 7 . In the 1990s, for example, the technological gap in communications was 60 percentage points greater than in agriculture, forestry and …shing.
Adoption of New Technologies and Returns to Human Capital
Although a thorough examination of the di¤erent patterns of adoption across sectors is beyond the scope of this paper, a deeper look at the aggregate data is a useful …rst step. In their in ‡u-ential paper, Nelson and Phelps (1966) conjecture that "[T]he rate at which the latest, theoretical technology is realized in improved technological practice depends upon educational attainment and upon the gap between the theoretical level of technology and the level of technology in practice" (p. 73). In terms of our notation, the discrete-time version of their equation (8) at the aggregate level is
where Á(h t ) is an increasing function of human capital stock in period t ¡ 1 and ¢Q t is the growth rate in the average practice between period t ¡ 1 and period t. 37 Given that we have data on Q t , ¡ t , and human capital we can estimate equation (11) using OLS by taking logs and appending a stochastic error term, which we assume is orthogonal to the regressors. Ho and Jorgenson (1999) construct an index of the quality of the labor force in the US in the postwar period based on several dimensions: age, education, gender, and occupation. When we estimate equation (11), we enter each of these di¤erent measures of human capital: age is proxied by the share of young workers aged 16-24, education by the share of college graduates, gender by the share of female workers, occupation by the share of self-employed. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 8 .
The coe¢cient on ¡ t in column (5) is about 0.7 and statisticall signi…cant from zero. By itself our measure of the technological gap captures roughly 85 percent of the variation in the growth rate of the average practice over time (column (1)). The residual 2 percent is explained by human capital: the shares of young workers, and college educated workers are positively associated with more rapid adoption of new technology, while the fraction of self-employed workers is not statisitically signi…cant. Hence, certain observable measures of "adaptability" do determine whether new technology is adopted, but they do not explain a large fraction of the time-series variation.
Nevertheless, the coe¢cient on the skilled share is remarkably high: a 1 percentage point increase in the share of college-educated workers induces a 10 percent acceleration in the speed of adoption (i.e., the growth rate of Q t rises by 10 percent). More puzzling at …rst is the negative and signi…cant estimate on the share of women in the labor force. Labor force participation of women has increased massively: in 1950 women accounted for less than one-third of the labor force, while in 1999 the share of women was close to 50 percent. Many models of labor force participation imply that the rise in participation rates takes place from the top of the ability distribution. Thus, the share of women is negatively correlated with the average level of unobserved ability among women and therefore in the workforce. According to this interpretation, the negative sign in the regression picks up the fall in unobserved ability and suggests that the latter is an important determinant of technology adoption. 38 Since our …rst pass at the aggregate data is so encouraging, in future research we plan to estimate the adoption equation at the industry level.
Another implication of Nelson and Phelps' adoption equation (11) is that a larger technological gap increases the marginal productivity of skilled workers and hence their relative wage. The time-series behavior of the technological gap for E&S squares with the well-known facts on wage 1. inequality. The gap increases steadily except when it levels o¤ during the 1970s, which is the only decade in the postwar period during which the education premium fell. In Figure 6 , we compare the returns to college education from Goldin and Katz (1999) and a smoothed version of the technological gap for E&S plotted in Figure 4 . 39 The two series move together at low frequencies, consistent with the idea that the technological gap may be an important force driving the skill premium.
Robustness
Our basic approach abstracts from a number of potentially important considerations. Paramount among these is how our measures of technical change would be a¤ected by changing factor shares, mismeasurement of constant-quality consumption, and ignoring mark-ups.
Factor Shares
The one-to-one mapping between the change in the relative price and the rate of technical change may break down when the shares of capital in the consumption and investment goods producing sectors di¤er. In such a model, with competitive markets and free factor mobility, it is simple to establish that the change in the relative price consists of two components
where ® c and ® i are the capital shares in the consumption and investment sectors, respectively, and ¢· t is the growth rate of the economy-wide capital-labor ratio.
We can assess the extent of the share-bias by constructing sector-speci…c capital shares and the capital-labor ratio. De…ne the investment goods sector as durable goods manufacturing and business services, which is dominated by software manufacturers, with the consumption goods sector consisting of the remaining industries. Such a break-down is not perfect, mostly because durable goods manufacturers produce at least some consumption goods. Nevertheless, classi…cation errors do not a¤ect the …nding that the consumption goods sector is considerably more capital intensive than the investment goods sector. According to our calculations -based on data since 1948 when full-time equivalent worker data at the industry level are …rst available -® c = 0:45 and ® i = 0:26.
Since the capital-labor ratio was growing at about 4.5 percent annual rate, our baseline measure of technical change underestimates actual growth by nearly .85 percentage points annually since 1948.
Moreover, this number is larger in the second part of the sample, suggesting that the acceleration of the 1980's could be slightly larger. In Figure 1 , we plot as a dashed line the bias-corrected series for technical change.
Mismeasurement
Our measure of investment-speci…c technical change is biased upward when quality improvement in consumption is neglected. Suppose NIPA consumption price indexes p c t understate quality by a factor u c t so that p c t = u c t p c ¤ t . Using this relation with equation (3), we conclude that the change in the price of investment relative to consumption overestimates technical change when ¢u c t > 0. The similarity we discussed in section 2.6 between various consumption price indexes gives us some con…dence that our measure is not seriously distorted. Nevertheless, it would be preferable to construct a constant-quality consumption price index using the sort of approach we adopt for measuring constant-quality investment. Unfortunately, the data for such an exercise are simply not available. Indeed, there are no studies documenting by how much the personal consumption expenditures de ‡ator (PCE) neglects quality improvement over the period we consider. We can get some idea from Moulton (2001) Rudd's calculations, the bias in the PCE is currently about 0.5 percentage point, which would reduce our yearly estimate of investment-speci…c technical change by the same amount. 40 It is tempting to conclude that the bias has increased over time due to increased expenditures on hightech durables. But this would be incorrect because, as argued above, methods for accounting for quality have also improved. Moreover, a discussion about whether the bias is, say, zero or 1 percentage point is secondary in our application. The quality bias in investment goods that we correct for is so large as to swamp even the largest estimates of the quality bias in PCE. 4 0 The calculations are based on private communication.
Mark-ups
Finally, in our simple model we assumed that goods markets are competitive. The presence of mark-ups in the investment and in the consumption goods sectors would also change our key equation (3) . Recall that we measure technical change in terms of growth rates, so constant markups would leave our results una¤ected. Time-varying mark-ups do pose a problem since we would attribute changes in mark-ups to changes in the state of technology. In particular, slower-growing (or faster declining) mark-ups in the investment good sector would bias upward our measure of investment-speci…c technical change.
Our industry-level data enable us to get a feel for how mark-ups in the consumption and investment sectors have evolved. 41 Denote the non-competitive price as e p t so that e p t = (1 + ¹ t )p t , where p t is the competitive price and ¹ t is the mark-up. From the de…nition of pro…ts, ¦ t = e p t y t ¡c t , where y t is output and c t is the cost of production. From the relation p t y t = c t , it follows that
where ¼ t is the pro…t rate, i.e. ¼ t = ¦ t =(e p t y t ), which can be calculated for the consumption and investment good sectors using our data.
Two conclusions emerge from these calculations. First, mark-ups have been falling in both sectors: in the investment (consumption) sector mark-ups decline from 23 (13) 
Conclusion
The quantitative importance of productivity improvement in investment goods is a central issue in a number of macroeconomic debates (on rising wage inequality, the productivity slowdown and resurgence, and the dynamics of the stockmarket, just to cite a few). In this paper, we use a price-based approach to measure technical change at the asset, industry, and aggregate level in the US from 1947 to 2000. Whenever we faced a choice in constructing the data, we opted for the 4 1 We classify the consumption and investment goods sectors in the same manner as described in Section 6.1. 4 2 Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986) estimate larger price-cost margins in the US (on the order of 26 percent in both sectors) between 1958-1981. However, in a companion paper (Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988 ) they modify their computation and essentially calculate pro…t rates, as we do (Table 5 , page 64). This adjustment reduces their estimate by 10 percentage points on average, leading to estimates of mark-ups in line with our numbers.
conservative alternative that understates the importance of quality improvement. Nevertheless, our aggregate and industry-level …ndings suggest that technical change in equipment and software in the postwar period has been large and was instrumental in the growth resurgence in the 1990s.
We show that the rate of technical change has accelerated in the past two decades. Most of the acceleration, initially, is due to a shift in investment toward computers, software, and communications equipment. However, later the growth rate of the leading edge technology accelerated for virtually every investment good and in every industry, demonstrating that information technology may cause generalized productivity improvements.
The fact that the productivity of new vintages advanced at about the same rate for every industry does not imply that the average practice did too, and indeed it did not. Certain industries kept up with the fast pace of technical change better than others, as demonstrated by our …nding of a widening of the cross-sectional distribution of the technological gap. Perhaps surprisingly, the gap was largest in industries like communications in which investment has been robust. The explanation is simply that technical change in these industries has outpaced even the rapid pace of investment. Why is there a subset of industries that exploit technological progress faster than others by investing heavily in new vintages of equipment and software?
The …rst encouraging lead comes from Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001, Figure 8 ), who show that small …rms outperformed large …rms in the stock market from 1973 to 1982. 43 After that period, large …rms outperformed small …rms. One interpretation of this …nding is that small …rms …rst adopted information technologies, boosting their expected pro…ts and their share prices. A decade later, large …rms started to invest massively in computers, software, and communications equipment, regaining their dominant position. This interpretation matches the behavior of the technological gap for IPES (Figure 4) , which increased quickly in the 1970s and leveled-o¤ in the last two decades once large …rms shifted investment to IPES from other equipment. 44 Second, at the aggregate level, we con…rm Nelson and Phelps' hypothesis that the speed of adoption of new technology is determined by the gap between the average and best practice, and by speci…c features of the workforce. In particular, we …nd aggregate evidence that younger, more able, and better-educated workers were the catalysts for adoption. Moreover, the increase in the college skill premium appears to re ‡ect the premium to "adaptability" during periods of rapid technological progress and expanding technological gap, where the demand for adaptable labor was especially strong.
To conclude, although at this stage of our research we cannot identify precisely the distinctive features of those organizations that led the adoption of the new technologies in the postwar US economy, two promising candidates are the size of …rms and the "adaptability" of the workforce. The order of the lags m and n is chosen to assure the best fit. In the three cases in which more than one lag was statistically significant, we report only the most precisely estimated lag to simplify the presentation.
Standard errors on coefficients are in parentheses. Each entry is the annual average during the period. The price-based measure of investment-specific technical change is calculated as the difference between the growth rate of constant-quality consumption and the growth rate of the quality-adjusted price of asset j. The contribution of each input is the ratio of the share-weighted real growth rate of the input and real GDP growth. The aggregate share of labor (capital) is 0.64 (0.36) over the sample period. 
